Domestic and Foreign Ownership of Private Sector in Mixed Duopoly

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Abstract This paper considers a quantity-setting mixed market model in which a public firm competes with a private firm. The paper examines the welfare effects of domestic and foreign ownership of the private firm. The paper shows that social welfare is maximized by full domestic ownership of the private firm, while consumer surplus is maximized by full foreign ownership of the private firm.

Keywords Mixed Duopoly, Full Domestic Ownership, Partial Domestic Ownership, Full Foreign Ownership

1. Introduction

As is very well known, mixed oligopolies are common in developed and developing countries as well as in former communist countries. Public firms compete with domestic and/or foreign private firms in many industries, such as the airline, banking, broadcasting, education, electricity, health care, home loans, life insurance, overnight delivery, rail, shipbuilding, telecommunications, and tobacco. For example, in the tobacco industries of France, Italy, Russia, Spain, Austria, Turkey, China, Japan, etc., we can find real-world examples in which public firms compete or competed against each other and other private firms such as Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds. In the Norwegian oil industry, the state-owned Statoil competes against two multinational corporations Esso Norge and Norske Shell (see[1]). Furthermore, Krugman and Obstfeld[2] describe foreign ownership as “In U.S. statistics, a U.S. company is considered foreign-controlled, and therefore a subsidiary of a foreign-based multinational, if 10 percent or more of stock is held by a foreign company; the idea is that 10 percent is enough to convey effective control.”

Fernández-Ruiz[39] investigates firms’ decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. He then considers a situation in which a fraction of the foreign private firm’s profits can be included in the domestic social welfare function.

We consider a quantity-setting mixed market model in which a public firm with social welfare objectives competes with a private firm with profit objectives. We examine the welfare effects of domestic and foreign ownership of the private firm. We show that social welfare is maximized by full domestic ownership of the private firm, while consumer surplus is maximized by full foreign ownership of the private firm. As a result of these, we find that neither consumer surplus nor social welfare is maximized by partial foreign ownership of the private firm.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a mixed duopoly model with a public firm and a private firm. Section 3 examines the welfare effect of domestic and foreign ownership of the private firm in the model. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.

2. The Model

Let us consider a mixed duopoly model with one public firm and one private firm. In the remainder of this paper, subscripts 0 and 1 denote the public firm and the private firm, respectively. There is no possibility of entry or exit. The duopolists produce perfectly substitutable commodities. The inverse demand function is given by \( P = 10 - Q \), where \( P \) is the market price, and \( Q \) is the total quantity of output in the market.

Each firm’s profit \( \pi_j \) is given by
\[ \pi_i = Pq_i - m_i q_i \quad (i = 0, 1), \]  

where \( q_i \) represents firm \( i \)'s output, and \( m_i \) is firm \( i \)'s constant marginal cost. We assume that the public firm is less efficient than the private firm, i.e. \( 0 < m_i < m_0 \). For simplicity, we normalize \( m_0 \) to one and \( m_1 \) to zero. The private firm aims to maximize its own profit.

Domestic social welfare \( W \) is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, and is given by

\[ W = \frac{Q^2}{2} + \pi_0 + \lambda \pi_1, \]  

where \( \frac{Q^2}{2} \) denotes consumer surplus, and \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \) is the level of domestic ownership. If \( \lambda = 1 \), the private firm is domestic owned. On the other hand, if \( \lambda = 0 \), the private firm is foreign owned and its profit is excluded from domestic social welfare. The public firm aims to maximize domestic social welfare. In this paper, we analyze the Nash equilibrium of the quantity-setting mixed duopoly model.

3. Results

We first present the equilibrium values of outputs and the price, obtained by maximizing (1) and (2) simultaneously:

\[ q_0 = \frac{2(9 - 5\lambda)}{2 - \lambda}, \]  

\[ q_1 = \frac{1}{2 - \lambda}, \]  

\[ Q = \frac{19 - 10\lambda}{2 - \lambda}, \]  

\[ P = \frac{1}{2 - \lambda}, \]  

\[ \pi_0 = \frac{2(-9 + 14\lambda - 5\lambda^2)}{(2 - \lambda)^2}, \]  

\[ \pi_1 = \frac{1}{(2 - \lambda)^2}. \]  

The maximization of \( \pi_0 \) with respect to \( \lambda \) is derived from \( d\pi_0/d\lambda \). That is, we have \( \lambda = 5/3 \approx 1.667 \). When \( \lambda = 0 \), \( \pi_0 = 4.5 \), and when \( \lambda = 1 \), \( \pi_0 = 0 \). When \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \), \( \pi_0 \) is a strictly increasing function of \( \lambda \). From (8), we easily see that when \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \), \( \pi_1 \) is a strictly increasing function of \( \lambda \).

Third, we consider domestic consumer surplus, which can be expressed as follows:

\[ CS = \frac{(19 - 10\lambda)^2}{(2 - \lambda)^2}. \]  

When \( \lambda = 0 \), \( CS = 45.125 \), and when \( \lambda = 1 \), \( CS = 40.5 \). \( CS \) is illustrated in Graph 1 as a function of \( \lambda \). That is, when \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \), \( CS \) is a strictly decreasing function of \( \lambda \).

Fourth, domestic social welfare can be expressed as follows:

\[ W = \frac{327 - 324\lambda + 80\lambda^2}{2(2 - \lambda)^2}. \]  

The maximization of \( W \) with respect to \( \lambda \) is derived from \( dW/d\lambda \). That is, we have \( \lambda = 1.5 \). \( W \) is illustrated in Graph 2 as a function of \( \lambda \). When \( \lambda = 0 \), \( W = 40.875 \), and when \( \lambda = 1 \), \( W = 41.5 \). That is, when \( 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \), \( W \) is a strictly increasing function of \( \lambda \).

We can now state the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** In the mixed market model with one public firm and one private firm, (i) consumer surplus is maximized by full foreign ownership of the private firm, and (ii) social welfare is maximized by full domestic ownership of the private firm.

This proposition indicates that neither consumer surplus nor social welfare is maximized by partial domestic ownership of the private firm.
4. Conclusions

We have considered a quantity-setting mixed market model in which a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We have examined the welfare effects of domestic and foreign ownership of the private firm. We have then demonstrated that social welfare is maximized by full domestic ownership of the private firm, while consumer surplus is maximized by full foreign ownership of the private firm.

REFERENCES


