Microeconomics and Macroeconomics
p-ISSN: 2168-457X e-ISSN: 2168-4588
2026; 12(1): 1-21
doi:10.5923/j.m2economics.20261201.01
Received: Oct. 4; Accepted: Oct. 29, 2026; Published: Nov. 17, 2026

Amarjit Singh1, Rajdeep Vraj Alpesh Kumar2
1Department of Civil, Environmental, and Construction Engineering, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, USA
2Department of Civil Engineering, IIT Gandhinagar, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India
Correspondence to: Amarjit Singh, Department of Civil, Environmental, and Construction Engineering, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, USA.
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Copyright © 2026 The Author(s). Published by Scientific & Academic Publishing.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
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This article assesses India’s macroeconomic performance in FY 2024–25 and FY 2025–26, using monetary management as the principal analytical framework and incorporating data and selected developments verified through July 2026. Fourteen indicators are examined, covering monetary policy, inflation, labour-market conditions, fiscal consolidation, merchandise and services trade, the current account, foreign investment, the exchange rate, monetary velocity, and tourism earnings. The findings reveal a qualified “goldilocks” configuration: real GDP growth of 7.1 percent in FY 2024–25 and 7.7 percent in FY 2025–26 coincided with exceptionally low CPI inflation, a cumulative 125-basis-point monetary easing cycle during 2025, and record gross FDI inflows of USD 94.53 billion in FY 2025–26. These favourable outcomes were accompanied, however, by a widening merchandise trade deficit, marked rupee depreciation, incomplete labour-market formalisation, and weak net FDI relative to gross inflows. Net FDI declined to approximately USD 0.96 billion in FY 2024–25 before recovering to USD 7.65 billion in FY 2025–26. The RBI reduced the policy repo rate to 5.25 percent, while headline CPI inflation reached a series low of 0.25 percent in October 2025. Strong services exports and remittance inflows supported current-account surpluses of USD 13.7 billion in Q4 FY 2024–25 and USD 7.1 billion in Q4 FY 2025–26, although the full-year FY 2025–26 current account remained in deficit by USD 25.2 billion, or 0.6 percent of GDP. The analysis concludes that India combined rapid growth, disinflation, and monetary easing with broad macroeconomic stability, but that the durability of this performance will depend on stronger external resilience, productive investment retention, labour formalisation, and continued fiscal consolidation.
Keywords: RBI monetary policy, Flexible inflation targeting, Fiscal consolidation, Exchange rate, FDI, Macroeconomic indicators, GDP growth
Cite this paper: Amarjit Singh, Rajdeep Vraj Alpesh Kumar, A Macroeconomic Analysis of India’s Current Economy: Growth, Stability, and Trajectory, Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2026, pp. 1-21. doi: 10.5923/j.m2economics.20261201.01.
![]() | Table 1. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators—India, FY 2023–24 to FY 2025–26 (Latest available official data; reference periods differing from the fiscal year are identified.) |
![]() | Table 2. India Real GDP Growth Rate — Verified Data (New Base 2022-23 where available) |
where r is the ex ante real interest rate, i is the nominal interest rate, and
is expected inflation (Fisher, 1930). Because the relevant variable is expected rather than contemporaneous inflation, observed CPI inflation cannot be treated as a precise measure of the ex ante real policy rate. It can, however, provide an ex post indication of monetary restrictiveness. Using December 2025 headline inflation of 1.33 percent as such a proxy, the 5.25 percent repo rate implied an approximate real policy rate of 3.92 percent. Immediately before the December rate cut, when the repo rate stood at 5.50 percent, the corresponding proxy would have been approximately 4.17 percent.Thus, the sharp decline in inflation would have raised the real policy rate—and tightened monetary conditions passively—had the nominal repo rate remained unchanged. The 125-basis-point easing cycle partly offset this effect and reduced the real cost of borrowing relative to what it otherwise would have been. By retaining a neutral stance, however, the MPC avoided committing itself to further reductions and preserved the flexibility to respond to incoming inflation, growth, and financial-market data (Reserve Bank of India, 2025a).
And therefore,
where
is the money stock,
is income velocity,
is the price level, and
is real output. The transactions formulation,
is conceptually similar, but nominal GDP is generally used because the total volume of transactions is not directly observable (Fisher, 1911).In FY 2024–25, broad money (M3) grew by 9.6 percent, while nominal GDP increased by 9.8 percent. Since income velocity is measured as nominal GDP divided by the money stock, these closely matched growth rates indicate that M3 velocity remained broadly stable during the year. This does not, by itself, demonstrate that monetary easing generated real growth without inflation; output and prices were also influenced by credit conditions, fiscal policy, food supplies, energy prices, and productive capacity. By December 2025, M3 growth had accelerated to 12.1 percent, compared with 9.0 percent a year earlier, reflecting stronger deposit and bank-credit growth following monetary and liquidity easing (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 2026c). India’s UPI-based payments system substantially reduces the time and cost of transferring funds. UPI processed approximately 21.63 billion transactions in December 2025, with a value of ₹27.97 lakh crore (National Payments Corporation of India, 2026). Digital payments improve payment-system efficiency, expand access to formal finance, and permit funds to be transferred and reused more rapidly. They should not, however, be equated automatically with higher measured monetary velocity. A rise in the number of digital transactions may reflect the replacement of cash payments, the splitting of purchases into smaller transactions, or repeated transfers of the same deposits without a corresponding increase in nominal GDP.![]() | Table 3. Policy Recommendations, Rationales, and Theoretical Anchors |
