1. Introduction

During the last 20 years, many cities, especially under developing countries, were growing rapidly due to economic growth and population migration ( Qian. L 2014). By the end of 2030, more than 50% of the World, the population was living inside the city (WHO, 2013). Land scarcity and demand in cities are also driving factors increasing the pressure on the governance of urban land management systems. Population growth and urbanization have a significant impact on driving up urban land value which affects housing and property affordability in the context of difficulties implementing planning functions and zoning regulations. Land management in Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa has presented a variety of challenges due to its historical, social, political, and cultural diversity. High-profile land grabs and illegal state land capture, land insecurity, and lack of participation in the land decision-making process are being exposed across several African nations. Like other African countries, urban land management practices across Ethiopia highlights worrying signs and indication of serious urban land management problems. Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi towns are no exception. In Ethiopia, urban land management practices and processes have been vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption due to the absence of good governance. Urban land management is often perceived as one of the most corrupt sectors in public administration in Ethiopia (Yiadom, et _al, 2014) cited in (Dinka, et_al 2016).

Under the FDRE, urban land is governed and administrated by the urban land leasehold law which has been amended three times since its first application in 1993 (proclamation. 80/1993, 272/2002, and 721/2011). On the other hand, urban land-related laws like proclamations No.574/2008 and the No. 818/214 are also included. All these legislations have primarily aimed to promote efficiency and effectiveness in urban land governance. However, this objective promoting good governance in urban land management appears to be a frightening statutory forecast due to gaps under the law itself and in the course of enforcement. The empirical studies indicate that urban land use planning, management, and urban land information could not promote good governance in urban land and discourage widespread unethical practices from the government (Y. Bekele, D. Kjosavik, 2016). The key challenges revolve around the inefficient and ineffective capacity of the institutions bestowed with the responsibility of urban plan preparation and implementation according to urban planning legal frameworks and the Structure plan and local development plan (LDP) preparation and implementation of good governance principles invested effort is not enough as compared with the size of urban towns.

The survey result conducted on different Ethiopian cities i.e. Bahir Dar, Addis Ababa, Hawasa, Dire Dawa, and other cities in Ethiopia by (Shewakena Aytenfisu, 2016, Gizachew Birhanu (2016), (Berhanu, et al, 2015), (Melesse et al., 2014) and (Nigussie, 2016) underlined that gaps and weaknesses in the urban land management as lack of coordination of the existing institutions, insecurity of tenure and illegal land settlements, lack of societal participation in decision making, and weak capacity for enforcement and monitoring of statutory planning laws and land use planning. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and efficiency of the urban land management, from the governance dimension studied at the local level of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi town on the topic yet. Therefore this paper is aimed to assess the challenges to practice good governance in urban land management; the case of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi Towns in Ethiopia.

2. Related Literature Review

Conceptual Framework for Governance in Urban Land Management

Currently, the concept of governance has become debatable agenda when sustainability needs consideration of balancing social, economic, and environmental components in the decision-making process. Currently, the discussion about governance has continued in various disciplines, even though the definition and concept remain debatable (Olowu, 2002). In this line, Sheng (2010) as cited in Samsudin (2014) perceptively states that governance is a complex concept and described in various ways, which is one side may refer to the quality of the public delivery system and on the other side may concern about the development of appropriate institutional framework by the political route. Urban Land governance includes the rules, processes, and structures throughout which decisions are made about the right to use land, the way the decisions are implemented and enforced, the means that challenging interests in urban land are managed (FAO, 2009). It includes state structures responsible for the urban land and covers the legal and policy framework for urban land, as well as traditional practices governing land transactions, inheritance, and dispute resolution systems (Ibd). Governance in the urban land executive is very important in many areas, as land management, especially in developing countries, grows increasingly vulnerable to maladministration. Whether pit or grand Corruption is much linked to weak governance in developing countries where having power over land a right is considered as a means of controlling political and economic power and privilege through fraud (FAO, 2007). Weak urban land governance is also linked to increasing insecurity in property rights and a soaring level of bribery and corruption in urban land management activities, particularly in the developing world. Studies conducted by Burns and Dalrymple (2008) in developing countries have witnessed that cities are unable to provide affordable urban land in sufficient quantities, particularly for the urban poor, because of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of land management. Regarding this, they pointed out that a Weak institutional and legal framework will affect the poor in particular and may leave them marginalized and outside the law.

Figure 1. Approach to Improving Governance in Urban Land Management (Source: Adopted from Bums, T and Dalrymple. K (2008))

Development practitioners of all persuasions recognize the importance of governance and the rule of law as a crucial precondition for economic and social development. In many contexts, urban land is identified as one of the most corrupt sectors together with the judiciary and the police Burns, T, and Dalrymple, K (2008). Still, given the complexity of urban land issues almost everywhere and the fact that institutional arrangements are highly specific, no systematic direction is accessible to identify and benchmark urban land governance and to improve it over time. The development of a conceptual framework began with a wide-ranging review of urban land management systems, in strengthening urban land management systems is summarized as follows.

Governance in Urban Land Management and its objectives

There are so many challenges that influence urban land management performances in the world. But Payne, G (2010) identified five major challenges that affect the performance of urban land management such as Security of tenure, Regulatory barriers Land use planning, the political economy of land, and the rise of neoliberals. Increasing populations, globalization, and climate change have increased demand for urban land, while market forces have raised prices to levels unaffordable to many. Urbanization has been the engine of economic growth, though conventional methods of managing urban growth have failed to meet the needs of predominantly low-income migrants and the indigenous urban populations. The challenges are greatest in peri-urban areas. Governance in the urban land executive is very important in many areas, as land management, especially in developing countries, grows increasingly vulnerable to maladministration. Whether pit or grand Corruption is linked to weak governance in developing countries where having power over land is considered as a means of controlling political and economic power and privilege through fraud (FAO, 2007).

Weak urban land governance is also linked to increasing insecurity in property rights and a soaring level of bribery and corruption in urban land management activities, particularly in the developing world.

The focus of this study is developing a set of statements that set out a consistent framework of objectives for good governance in urban land management. The indicators are used as an accepted set of objectives that can be again investigated at the grassroots level. Therefore two objectives for good governance in urban management have been used. The role of good governance was also developed from a considerate of the implications of ineffective, inequitable, and poorly functioning urban land management systems. Weak governance in urban land management is a key contributor to issues of informal modes of service delivery, corruption, limited land markets, tenure insecurity, informal settlements, unrealized investment potential in property, land speculation and encroachment, idle and unproductive use of land, inequitable land distribution, and inadequate provisions of infrastructure Burns, T, and Dalrymple, K (2008).

The urban land management systems become the foundation for the hierarchy of other instruments that support a wide range of natural resource use rights for activities associated with land, air, and water. These include land-use zoning, site development, allocation and use of air space, the allocation and use of water resources, and other natural resources. All level of rights in the chain of command is accompanied by more a specialized urban land management governance system because they stand for value-adding in different land markets and economic systems. Land management is keeping pace by imposing land-use planning and connected development restrictions. Sustainable urban land management must be lined up with society's needs and undertaken in a participatory way. The effect of poor land-use planning is indirect as people will find informal means to cope with their needs, mainly when planning designs improperly predict or supply the necessary infrastructure issues distressing land-use arrangements, which often directly affect people’s livelihoods, and results in high levels of social unrest. There are also frequent problems enforcing master plans as they are either developed without due consideration of implementation preparations and capacity a non-participatory approach that meets strong community resistance. Similarly, zoning constraints should be reasonable by external effects, and firm in a clear and participatory way. Regulations and restrictions should be made through the ability to enforce them. However, in many, managing urban land without proper governance arrangements has given rise to significant building maintenance and redevelopment problems associated with old and unsafe land use planning.

On the other hand Land resources in all societies are finite and a fundamental basis for social and economic development Burns, T and Dalrymple, K (2008). An unbiased and clear urban land delivery process is more likely to have eager participants, than an unfair and non-transparent system. Poor systems for property valuation and taxation can be an indication of poor governance in urban land management. These direct to vagueness in market prices, difficulties in valuing property, constrain urban land markets, increased urban land disputes and appeals, loss of revenue, and unfair property tax burdens. The valuation process provides the framework for statutory valuation purposes and should be transparent and fair. Valuation information values should be made openly available to improve transparency in the urban land market. These principles s are necessary to remove the common practice of under-declared values associated with high property transfer fees and taxation rates.

To evaluate urban land management from a good governance perspective requires a precise and well-defined evaluation framework. According to K. Deininger, Selod, & Burns (2011), FAO (2007), and Word Bank (2013), the land governance assessment framework (LGAF) which was developed by the World Bank and its partners is one of the most well-known frameworks used to evaluate the good governances in the urban land management. Therefore, based on the objective of these studies the (LGAF) is used to assess challenges to practice good governance in urban land management because LGAF is one of the most comprehensive and diagnostic tool frameworks for the evaluation of urban land governance practices from a different perspective.

Urban Land Management System in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s legal system is hierarchical mainly at federal and regional levels. It gives the regional government considerable autonomy over land administration systems. Each Regional state government strives to include and interpret the federal land policy and ensure the harmony of systems in their peculiarities as the land tenure systems and the socio-economic context varies across regions. Whereas the Federal land policy guidelines and legal framework provide broader statements, regional proclamations set out detailed provisions reflecting their differences. The decentralization of powers to regions and local level administrations provides the room and flexibility for incorporations of these variations. Alemie (2015) revealed the land policy and law-making process in the three government regimes (Imperial, Derg, and EPRDF). He argued the level of participation in the land policy and law-making process is very minimal if ‘’not nonexistent. The law-making process in Ethiopia is entirely a government affair and stakeholders are rarely asked or consulted on proposed laws that affect their lives. Conversely, Ethiopia’s legal framework on urban land contains its constitution and follows land laws enacted by the Federal Government for rural and urban land management the law being introduced that define and differentiated rural land from urban land started in the 1970s. The then military Government of Ethiopia enacted proclamation 47/1975 to nationalize all urban lands and extra-urban houses. Hence, since 1975, Ethiopia administers and manages urban lands by establishing different legal systems and different institutions. Many proclamations were repealed and replaced successively. The current land laws include proclamation 455/2005 enacted for compensation matters, proclamation 721/2011 for urban land administration/lease law, and proclamation 818/2014 for urban land registration. There are also regional constitutions, laws, regulations, and directives. The federal constitution (Article 40) states that the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all-natural resources, is exclusively vested in the state and the people of Ethiopia. The main concern of the Government in advocating state ownership is that private ownership will lead to the concentration of urban land in the hands of few people who can buy resulting in the eviction of poor landholders and thus frustrating landlessness. Therefore challenges to practice good governance in urban land management does not examine at the local level to promote efficiency at the root level.

3. Research Methodology

Overview of Study Area

Gelan and lega Tafo lega Dadhi towns are emerging new cities. Gelan is located in Special Zone surrounding Finfinne in Oromia regional state which is located 25 km away from Addis Ababa in the South-East direction or between 7°12’- 9°14’N Latitudes and 38°32’ – 39°32’ E Longitudes. Whereas Lega Tafo Lega Dadi is also located in Special Zone surrounding Finfinne located 21 km away from Addis Ababa in the North-East direction. Gelan boundary is physically attached to Addis Ababa and Dukam and the total area of the City is 75.16 km² (7516) hectares whereas Lega Tafo Lega Dadi town is bordered by Addis Ababa city and Sululta Wereda from the west and Northwest, by Berek Aleltu Wereda from the North, East and South with a total area of 7444.53 hectares. Currently, the population of Gelan town increase to male 31043 female 33687 total 64729 and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi town population also increase to male 17927 Female 22937 total 40864 (Lega Tafo Lega Dadi and Gelan towns admin, 2019). Both towns were established after the establishment of some investments around and have been grown by displacing and affecting the livelihood of local farmers.

The Maps of study areas

Research design

The study employed a qualitative and quantitative research approach to identify and understand gaps under the challenges to practice good governance in urban land management.

The researcher selected the areas after critical observation and aims to assess the gap to practice good governance in urban land management by focusing on national, regional, and town levels. Based on the aim to describe in detail the current performances of urban land management descriptive-case study types were employed. This research utilizes quantitative data generated by a cross-sectional survey questionnaire and qualitative data collected via key informant interview (structured interview) and focus-group discussion. Whereas quantitative data was measured using a Likert scale.

Sample Technique and Size

Non-probability and probability sampling techniques were employed to select samples from the population. The researchers purposely selected the key informants: from each town, mayors, land management officials, head of judicial from each town, four kebele officials from each town, investment offices (2) and (2) land experts, (2) urban planners expert, from each town were interviewed and totally 24 officials and experts were interviewed. From probability sampling, the researchers used systematic random sampling to identify respondents from each town and kebeles. The study population for this research consisted of the heads of households in two towns. According to the data obtained from Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi town administrations, their household numbers were Gelan 8722 and L/ Tafo L/Dadi 8173, a total of 16,895 and researchers would use Yamane’s formula (1967), therefore, the sample size of household respondents would be determined by using the following formula

n= N/(1+N(e)²) n=391.

The sample size for each town will be determined from the total sample size based on the household size of each town by the stratified sampling formula

• ni= (n/N)Ni where,

Hence

○ Gelan = (391/16,895) 8722 = 202

○ L/ Tafo L/Dadi = (391/16,895) 8173 = 189

Therefore 391 sample representatives would be considered in two towns as a respondent in survey questionnaires. Selecting a random starting point for independent household K = N/n. the formula would be used. Besides researcher adds 20% of a sample size to increase the rate of return i.e 391*20/100 = 78 questionnaires were distributed in additionally.

Data Analysis Method

The qualitative and quantitative data collected from respondents were analyzed descriptively. In the process of mixed data analysis, qualitative data analysis was dominantly employed. Three hundred ninety-one (391) questionnaires were distributed to the head of households and all questionnaires were returned and entered to SPSS version 20 for the statistical analysis. The result of statistical analysis is presented using percentages; tables and graphs while data collected through interviews, secondary data, and focus groups were analyzed through interpretation, narration, and content analysis, and finally, data collected through interviews, focus group discussions, and questionnaires were triangulated.

4. Research Findings and Discussion

According to existing urban land regulation and implementation, practices show that Ethiopia's urban land management is delegated under the federal constitution to regional states, city governments, and municipalities. Nevertheless, there is no common denominator to manage urban land in different regional states in Ethiopia. While the 271/2011 Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation stipulates that the leasehold system will apply to all urban land areas irrespective of how they were acquired, relevant authorities have yet to adopt the leasehold system. This paved the way for the coexistence of dissimilar systems and a high level of informality.

Besides the survey result revealed that the practice of urban land management was ineffective and inefficient. The main causes of infectiveness and inefficiency of urban land management include state capture, administration corruption, lack of clear policies, weak institutions capacity, improper application of good governance principles, and poor urban land information system were pointed out as the major causes. This ineffectiveness and inefficiency of urban land management were, in turn, resulted in less revenue collection, illegal or informal settlement, and urban land disputes. The inadequate revenue collection of the towns had a great impact on the provision of infrastructure which was observed that the revenue collection from urban land and property rent of the towns was very less as planned every year. The following are challenges that influence urban land management discussed in detail as follows

4.1. State Capture of Urban Land Policy

The survey result indicates that the main causes of that challenge urban land management were linked with law formulation and its use. The Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia's constitutional land-related laws suffers from many common defects, ranging from the form in which they are enacted to how they define the fundamental nature of the power relationship between the state and its citizens. An interview made with urban planners, land experts, and officials revealed that FDRE Land laws, particularly in the area of urban land management, are procured and passed by the economically viable and social influential to assist their benefitting from state actions than from any alleged need of society. Because the Ethiopian Constitution asserts state ownership of land and there are no private property rights inland. Even if there is a debate on the existence of different ownership and tenure regimes for urban land in Ethiopia and the government is not prepared at this time to legalize private property rights inland. The Government of Ethiopia has decentralized the administration of urban land to the regional governments; the formulation of the broad land policy still rests with the federal government. FDRE proclamations offer some land rights guarantees and some rights for regional government, but there is no nationwide urban land guiding principle and organization that serves as a coordinating body at the national level of government for policy discussion and coordination of urban land management. The Federal law vests primary rights in the state through a decentralized administration of land, so far the broader dialogue of property rights and policy alternatives within the context of existing constitutional provisions are insufficient. The government still maintains key rights in the property, it could precede a system of long-term leases that vest strong secondary rights in landholders, allow them to sublease or make other land transactions. These long-term leases would not help to address the major weaknesses in the existing land tenure system. These become contributory factors for the ineffective and inefficiencies of urban land management. The detailed indicators of state capture on urban land policy discussed as follows

4.1.1. Urban Land and the Power of States

As indicated in table 1.1 the respondents were asked to rate their view urban land sector is not controlled by the powerful to exploit the state’s power for their purposes. Accordingly, 192(49.1%) and 66(16.9%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 64(16.4%) and 16(4.1%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 53(13.6%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.1 it can be stated that the majority of 192(49.1%) respondents were confirmed that the urban land sector was controlled by the influential to exploit the state’s power for their purposes.

Table 1.1. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy related with state power

Besides interviews conducted with urban land experts revealed that the urban land management structure is weak because the powerful are dominate the competition for scarce land resources. An extreme form of corruption occurs on a grand scale through state capture. These findings are supported by Transparency International (2009), the definition of state capture is a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies, or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment, and economy to benefit their private interests. Therefore the data revealed that urban land sector those in power illegally transferred urban lands to their relatives and allies and they decide urban land governance and laws in their favor. Undeniably, the urban land is supposedly often used as a political instrument by the technocrats and allocated in favor of political officials and powerful groups. Hence, the urban land sector was controlled by the powerful to exploit the state’s power for their purposes in general and particularly in study areas.

4.1.2. The Courts Decisions in Urban Land Conflicts

As indicated in table 1.2 the respondents were asked to rate their view on the courts does not give decisions in urban land conflicts that favor the powerful irrespective of the merits of the case. Accordingly, 198(50.6%) and 57(14.6%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 66(16.9%) and 18(4.6%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 52(13.3%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.2 it can be stated that the majority of 198(50.6%) respondents were confirmed that the courts did give decisions in urban land conflicts that favor the powerful irrespective of the merits of the case.

Table 1.2. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy associated with land conflict

These findings supported by focus group discussion made with urban land experts and first instance court experts with the argument of those who have enough money biased the court decision in study areas because there is no strong check and balance between organs of the states and the urban land rule and regulations also create a conducive environment for such actions. For instance, sometimes urban management officials can directly intervene in the issues of courts to influence the decision. In contrast, the judges also biased the decision in the favor of the dominant people for the seek of the bribe. Hence, the judges did give decisions in urban land conflicts in favor of the powerful irrespective of the merits of the case.

4.1.3. The Responsibility of the State and Public Interest

As indicated in table 1.3 the respondents were asked to rate their view on the organs of the state, such as the police and judiciary, who are responsible to serve the interests of the public instead of a group. Accordingly, 212(54.2%) and 64(16.4%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 53(13.6%) and 18(4.6%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 44(11.3%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.3 it can be stated that the majority of 212(54.2%) respondents were confirmed that the organs of the state, such as the police and judiciary, served the interests of the specific group instead of public interest.

Table 1.3. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy related to interest of the public

Since there is virtually no strong system of checks and balances between government organs the state in towns, such as the police and judiciary, were not responsible to serve the interests of the public, and the powerful bias the decisions of the court. Thus the organs of the state, such as the police and judiciary, served the interests of a certain group instead of the public interest.

4.1.4. Illegal Forced Evictions of Urban Land

As indicated in table 1.4 the respondents were asked to rate their view on Powerful groups that do not take the urban land of the poor through illegal forced evictions. Accordingly, 198(50.6%) and 70(17.9%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 69(17.6%) and 11(2.8%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 43(11%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.4 it can be stated that the majority of 198(50.6%) respondents were confirmed that powerful groups took the land of the poor through illegal forced evictions.

Table 1.4. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy related to eviction

Because there is no strong judiciary body that is responsible for the people. Powerful groups took evicted the poor or farmers' lands in the name of investment but still the land was taken for the public purpose was idle. As an interview made with kebele and town administration officials, the powerful can evict the urban land of poor as well as public land as the result of lack of strong institution which gives guaranty for state and individual. Hence, powerful groups took the land of the poor for the name of public purpose through illegal forced evictions.

4.1.5. The Acquisition of Urban Land from Individuals and Groups for Public Purpose

As indicated in table 1.5 the respondents were asked to rate their view on there is no compulsory purchase to acquire the land of individuals and groups at a low value for redeveloped for private gain. Accordingly, 201(51.4%) and 65(16.6%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 57(14.6%) and 14(3.6%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 54(13.8%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.5 it can be stated that the majority of 201(51.4%) respondents were confirmed that there was compulsory purchase to acquire the urban land of individuals and groups at a low value for redeveloped for private gain in name of public purpose.

Table 1.5. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy for redevelopment

4.1.6. The Urban Land Rezoning and Principles of Land Use Planning

As indicated in table 1.6 the respondents were asked to rate their views on the urban land of the powerful group are not rezoned for a higher value with no regard to statuary of land use planning. Accordingly, 232(59.3%) and 50(12.8%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 50(12.8%) and 19(4.9%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 40(10.2%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.6 it can be stated that the majority of 232(59.3%) respondents were confirmed that urban land of the powerful group was rezoned for a higher value with no regard to statuary of land use planning.

Table 1.6. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy related to rezoned

For instance, major infrastructures develop in the favor of powerful/rich peoples because of the influence of the government officials by their power on the socio-economic and political activities in the towns. As interview questions revealed that these practices are seen in Lega Tafo Lega Dadi than Gelan town. The practice of urban decision-makers sometimes rezoned the area without considering the land use planning for purpose of personal seen in the study areas. Therefore the urban land of the powerful group was rezoned for a higher value use without regard to principles of land use planning.

4.1.7. Urban Public Land Transfer and Payment

As indicated in table 1.7 the respondents were asked to rate their view urban public land is not transferred to the powerful without payment or for a small fee. Accordingly, 232(59.3%) and 50(12.8%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 50(12.8%) and 19(4.9%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 40(10.2%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 1.7 it can be stated that the majority of 232(59.3%) respondents were confirmed that urban public land was transferred to the powerful without payment or for a small fee.

Table 1.7. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of state capture of urban land policy

Besides interview discussion conducted with the urban planners revealed that urban public land use transfer to the rich without any payment for the town administration rather pay informally for officials. Besides these practices seen in both towns of the study areas and could be implemented through the urban land was transferred to the individual in the name of public purpose. Therefore urban public land was transferred to the powerful without payment or for a small fee.

4.2. Urban land and Administration Corruption

Survey result indicates that the payment of bribery and informal fees have widely seen in the urban land sector. According to the discussion made with the experts of urban land within focus group discussion the institutionalization of informal fees has become so commonplace in urban land management and without informal fees sometimes it was impossible to get a plot of land in towns. These are supported by World Economic Forum (2013) as corruption in urban land management in Ethiopia was an inefficient government bureaucracy and it becomes the second and third most problematic factor for doing business, respectively. Besides the auction processes for accessing urban land, in particular, are also argued to be highly vulnerable to corruption. Currently, in urban areas as general and study areas particularly, most allocation of public land for, manufacturing, commerce, and construction purposes occurs through auctions. The efficiency of auctions in ensuring accurate pricing is argued to be questionable as there have been inexplicable fluctuations in auction prices in Lega Tafo Lega Dadi and Gelan towns. There was no adequate information was publicly available in case of the allocation of urban public land in towns, the amount allocated, the mode of allocation, the stakeholder involved, or the conditions of allocations. One method to illegally allocate urban land is to allocate it to cooperative housing which selected the beneficiaries from other areas informally through giving the kebeles Identification card. Besides, there was the case of conspiracy and illegal land speculation in the bidding and auctioning of urban land. According to discussion with land and first instance courts in FGD, lack of transparency in the town’s officials and urban land management process has formed a collection of wealthy collectors and urban land speculators that take advantage of public land resources. Under the lease system, the urban land is allocated to individuals and organizations with the obligation that land has to be developed according to the planned use based on the 721/2011 land lease proclamation. However, there are several cases of allocated urban land remaining idle for long periods in study areas.

4.2.1. Enforcement of Regulations and Payment

As indicated in table 2.1 the respondents were asked to rate their view payment is not extracted by experts /officials to perform a free service, to prevent the enforcement of regulations, to secure a favorable decision, or to speed up a process. Accordingly, 197(50.4%) and 56(14.3%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 67(17.1%) and 25(6.4%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 46(11.8%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, table 2.1 can be stated that the majority of 197(50.4%) respondents were confirmed that Payment was extracted by experts/officials to perform a free service, to prevent the enforcement of regulations, to secure a favorable decision, or to speed up a process.

Table 2.1. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of administration corruption linked to payment

According to these data and interview revealed that the practice informal payment to speed up the decisions and prevent the enforcement of regulations become common and people took as the norm in the urban land sector.

4.2.2. Valuations of Land and the Tax Payments

As indicated in table 2.2 the respondents were asked to rate their view Valuations of land are do not understate to minimize the tax payments or overstated to support mortgage fraud. Accordingly, 199(50.9%) and 81(20.7%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 46(11.8%) and 17(4.3%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 48(12.3%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 2.2 it can be stated that the majority of 199(50.9%) respondents were confirmed that Valuations of land were sometimes understated to minimize the tax payments or overstated to support mortgage fraud is commonly known in study areas.

Table 2.2. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of administration corruption related to land valuation

On the other hand, the institutionalization of informal fees has become so commonplace in urban land management and without informal fees sometimes it was impossible to get a plot of land in towns. The urban land sector had neither adequately trained staff for the land policy being developed nor the resources to carry out these programs. These linked with a high degree of informality.

4.2.3. Inconsistent Regulations and Payment

As indicated in table 2.3 the respondents were asked to rate their views on urban communities that don’t pay experts/officials to prevent unfavorable treatment such as inconsistent regulations. Accordingly, 238(60.9%) and 63(16.1%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 48(12.3%) and 8(2%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 48(12.3%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 2.3 it can be stated that the majority of 238(60.9%) respondents were confirmed that urban communities were pay experts/officials to prevent unfavorable treatment such as inconsistent regulations.

Table 2.3. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of administration corruption related to residents

4.2.4. Officials/Experts' Influence on Urban Land Decisions

As indicated in table 2.4 the respondents were asked to rate their views on Officials/experts who don’t use their influence in favor of the family, political associates, and friends. Accordingly, 216(55.2%) and 75(19.2%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 48(12.3%) and 13(3.3%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 39(10%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 2.4 it can be stated that the majority of 216(55.2%) respondents were confirmed that Officials/experts used their influence in favor of the family, political associates, and friends.

Table 2.4. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of administration corruption associated to officials/experts

In addition to these interviews made with key informant groups and focus groups revealed that officials used their position in the favor of the powerful groups than the public use to serve him/her public use. As a result, urban Land use planning and regulations were unable to cope with urban growth and effectively guided urban spatial expansion, and unable to protect cultural buildings with historical buildings and drive people into informalities.

4.3. The Capacity of Urban Land Management

Town administration cannot adequately implement its urban land management reform programs as a result of the lack of capacity of the town administration to carry out these policies. The urban land sector had neither adequately trained staff for the land policy being developed nor the resources to carry out these programs.

4.3.1. Availability of Resources Managing Urban Land

There were limited technical resources to ensure good governance in study areas. Land uses planning in both towns were inefficient because of a lack of offices and resources for fieldwork. The informality of tenure and a backlog of cases exist because there was insufficient capacity to deal with them. Capacity was seen to mean both human resources as well as technical and financial resources. One of the good governance problems was an underfunded staff with low motivation that operates in an environment of complicated procedures.

As indicated in table 3.1 the respondents were asked to rate their view on there is the availability of resources for urban land management system implementation. Accordingly, 210(53.7%) and 69(17.6%) respondents were replied disagree and strongly disagree, while 50(12.8%) and 12(3.1%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 50(12.8%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.1 it can be stated that the majority of 210(53.7%) respondents were confirmed that there was no availability of resources for urban land management system implementation.

Table 3.1. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity related to resource

Moreover, capacity constraints were seen as a major hindrance to the study areas to carry out its land management and record land rights. Computerization was not implemented and it is challenged by the lack of other infrastructure. Non-computerized systems have cumbersome procedures that take significantly more time to deliver adequate service to the people. Also, there were issues of displacement and loss of files that cause good governance problems in the towns. These results of the lack of financial sustainability of the land registry were seen in the study areas.

4.3.2. Qualified and Competent Staff

As indicated in table 3.2 the respondents were asked to rate their view on there is qualified and competent staff in the urban land management office. Accordingly, 209(53.5%) and 66(16.9%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 70(17.9%) and 7(1.8%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 39(10%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.2 it can be stated that the majority of 209(53.5%) respondents were confirmed that there was no qualified and competent staff in the urban land management office.

Table 3.2. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity associated to urban land staff

Also those responsible for achieving good governance lack qualifications, skills, or experience. There was no sufficient qualified staff available in the urban land sector. Shortage of qualified personnel operating, material, and resources are very challenging in the implementation of urban land tenure in town administrations. Therefore regulations even some times did not translate into local languages.

4.3.3. Institutional Capacity

The institutional capacity, institution arrangements, and work culture in the urban land sector are very important for an efficient and effective land management system. The institutional memory and capacity and culture of urban land management work were lost, creating a perfect environment for a decline in weak governance. These studies revealed that weak institutional capacity is one of the major factors that affect the urban land management practice of the towns. The town administrations were weak both institutionally and other important technical materials to run the land and land-related activities efficiently. As indicated in table 3.3 the respondents were asked to rate their view on there is institutional capacity, institution arrangements, and work culture in the land urban land sector. Accordingly, 201(51.4%) and 76(19.4%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 48(12.3%) and 14(3.6%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 52(13.3%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.3 it can be stated that the majority of 201(51.4%) respondents were confirmed that there were no institutional capacity, institution arrangements, and work culture in the land urban land sector.

Table 3.3. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity associated to institution and work culture

Besides, operating the urban land activity without the employee and processor's job description or work, manual was a great challenge in promoting those principles of good governance with land management. Besides, the exact person was needed at the exact place, which is not practically implemented. So, it has a great impact on urban land on the implementation of good governance principles. This hinders the urban land sector to deliver proper service and fulfill the community needs efficiently which finally failed the land management performance.

4.3.4. Negligence

A negligent act is the effect of a lack of being concerned rather than capacity. There was a sign of negligence of things that should have been done were not as a result of political ideology.

Table 3.4. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity related to negligence

As indicated in table 3.4 the respondents were asked to rate their view negligence act is do not seen in the urban land sector. Accordingly, 225(57.5%) and 87(22.3%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 37(9.5%) and 13(3.3%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 29(7.4%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.4 it can be stated that the majority of 225(57.5%) respondents were confirmed that the negligence action was seen in the urban land sector.

Moreover according to the interview made with experts of the urban land the employees were not committed to implementing the role that was given to them because they believed that the land management process was done in the favor of the official interest than the urban land use planning procedure and this results from the negligence among the urban land management experts. These indicate that there were failures to make officials accountable for their actions.

4.3.5. Strong Judiciary Body and Implementation of Urban Land Rule and Regulation

As indicated in table 3.5 the respondents were asked to rate their view there is a strong judiciary in this town for implementation of urban land rule and regulation. Accordingly, 208(53.2%) and 93(23.8%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 42(10.7%) and 10(2.6%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 38(9.7%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.5 it can be stated that the majority of 208(53.2%) respondents were confirmed that there was no strong judiciary in town for the implementation of land rule and regulation.

Table 3.5. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity related to judiciary body

The decision-making process in urban land management in federal, regional, and town levels also has its limitation from land-use policy and regulations preparation up to its implementation. The legal framework on urban land as per the document, the community or a stakeholder group affected by particular projects do not consult and a public partnership was not practically enforced and no responsible body who evaluated land policies implementation based on set principles and take responsibility for failures in town administration level.

4.3.6. Mismanagement Acts

As indicated in table 3.6 the respondents were asked to rate their view on Mismanagement acts do not see in urban land management in this town. Accordingly, 223(57%) and 82(22%) respondents were replied to disagree and strongly disagree, while 45(9%) and 6(1.5%) respondents were replied agree and strongly agree and 35(9%) respondents replied undecided. Thus, from table 3.6 it can be stated that the majority of 223(57%) respondents were confirmed that Mismanagement acts see in urban land management in this town.

Table 3.6. Response rate of respondents on the indicator of capacity related to management

Moreover, according to an interview made with the management of the urban land sector indicates that mismanagement practices seen in towns due to lack of resources and competent staff and the signs of corruption practiced in the town.

4.4. Lack of Clear Urban Land Policies

The urban land management system is concerned with a high degree of lack of formality because of a lack of clear legislation and misunderstanding about the applicability of the rule and regulation. Indeed, where there is rule and regulation, implementation guidelines are oftentimes lacking, in towns which creates misunderstanding among employers. No single document sets in towns in urban land policy which coordinating and evaluating at the federal and regional level to avoid misunderstanding among the towns. Instead, laws and policies must be inferred from federal laws, together with laws and directives set by regional governments which have no uniformity among the regions as well as its implementation based on the town administration's decisions. In some cases, there is a misunderstanding of the applicability of laws. Moreover, urban land management issues are determined by unpublished administrative directives by officials that often change quickly and without the public become aware of which have seen practically in study areas. For instance, there is no clear system of urban land valuation as a result of no cadastre implementation in study areas. Similarly, the lack of a clear land valuation system has led to very low rents that do not reflect the economic values of properties, which results from the inefficiency of local governments to collect the income.

The lack of effective dispute resolution in the urban land management system gives officials a lot of judgment in resolving disputes. Rules for access to urban land are not clear and some have better access than others, largely due to relationships or payment of bribes seen in urban areas.

Besides, there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles, responsibilities, and mandates of institutions at the town level, for instance, overlapping of the mandate between the urban land sector and investment sector on the urban land transfer. Indeed, experts note that there is an absence of a strong national institution that coordinates from the federal and regional level that gives clear guidelines as well as technical and financial guidance for and urban lands. Urban Land management is delegated under the federal constitution to regional states, city/town administration, and municipalities. However, there is no common procedure to administer land in urban areas because of the different directives given by officials without considering the rule and regulations enacted by federal and regional states. Urban land is delivered through a lease system, a continuous permit system, and it apart legislation for condominiums. While the 271/2011 Urban Land Lease Holding rules stipulate that the leasehold system will implement in all towns irrespective of how they were acquired, relevant powers that be have yet to adopt the leasehold system. This results in the coexistence of diverse systems and a high level of informality.

4.5. Program Consistency

The programs lack consistency from region to region, town to town including in the way land is administered and the use rights that are granted. The most prominent inconsistencies are in the provisions allowing subleases. A thorough review of regional programs and experiences is necessary to determine how much consistency is needed between towns and how much autonomy they should have in developing their land management directives. slight inconsistencies between towns may not be a difficulty as long as the differences are not so great as to deject investment from towns to towns.

There is no federal well as the regional institution responsible for urban land management to support and coordinate town administration efforts. At the town/city/the regional level, institutional structures vary from town to town based on the structure of the towns. Each one has follows a dissimilar approach to urban land management institutional structures. at to improve urban land management and thereby improve land tenure security for land users, though it is unclear how effective that will be in isolation from other interventions. Some user rights are transferable in the form of subleasing or rental provision, but there are some limitations in terms of the lease periods and the amounts of urban land to be leased out.

Land allocation is not ruled out in both the federal land proclamation and some regional proclamations and theoretically can still take place through house cooperation some of them through the auction. Still, there is no common directive from the federal and regional governments. Regional land rules have stated land use rights for landholders, peri-urban farmers, and others that can be managed by the town administration. In these cases, land users who have land taken by the states were not supposed to be paid. Nevertheless, the whole expropriation process is not clearly described in these proclamations. This program lacks consistency, including in the way urban land is managed and the user rights that are granted from town to town. The most notable inconsistencies are in their organizational structures, inheritance, and the provisions permitting subleases. Town’s administration cannot adequately implement their urban land administration reforms. It appears that the town’s administrations have not adequately thought through monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of their reform efforts. There is a tiny capacity for the diffusion of information to the public about the various urban land management reform and the impact of local resource use.

4.6. The Application of Good Governance Principles

As the study revealed that, the urban land management sector failed in implementing the principles of good governance in day-to-day activities of land and land-related property administration of the town. Accordingly, the participation of the local community by the town administrations especially in the implementation and controlling the negative effects of inefficient urban land management was very poor and it needs serious attention for the future betterment of the town development. Another key issue and driver of good governance problems is the lack of transparency, accountability, and access to information. The transparency and accountability practice of the urban land management sector was not as required. This is obviously due to the absence of regular public discussion and consultation. Lack of transparency was seen almost in all aspects of the urban land management process. This creates a system of uncertainty and a lack of clarity for those involved in urban land management and causes mismanagement. There were no individually held urban properties that have been recorded and the records are not reliable and the cadastral system does not properly implement. Urban land management also lacks an inventory of public land systems. This makes the issuing of forged documents easier. There was also a lack of transparency in the allocation and transfer of public land to an individual. Moreover, the lack of transparency heightens the insecurity of many land users who are unaware of their corruption in urban land management in the study areas. Experts agree that there is limited participation in the urban land management process. So, the effort of the town administration to create awareness about urban land management issues was less effective and less transparent to the public. The rule of law was less enforced and according to informants the practice of accountability was less effective.

Poor urban land information can result in poor land governance which in turn affects the expected performance and implementation of good governance principles. The study depicted that in study areas town administration was not used as a modern urban land information system and the land and land-related registration of the town was less effective. Data shows that poor land information systems result in urban land management did not fully know who owns what and how much plot of land. Even the urban land sector couldn’t identify and record those informal settlers and illegal developers within town jurisdiction. So, such a poor urban land information system laid a critical problem on the town’s revenue collection and infrastructure provision. Generally, good urban governance practices concerning the principles of good governance- transparency, accountability, participation, and rule of law have not been successfully implemented by the town administration.

4.7. Urban Land Monitoring and Evaluation

Federal and Regional governments do not appear to have adequately thought through monitoring and evaluating the impacts of their reform efforts. Without this information, it could be difficult to measure impacts, review and modify existing administrative procedures, and develop new policy reform measures. There was no evidence of any mechanism to plan evaluation and the impact of land use, land disputes in study areas. The plan implementation process was not evaluated to check the progress of structure plan implementation to reduce wastage of urban land and irregular land use morphology and attract investors before the planning period is over.

5. Conclusions

The government set out policy direction and designed strategies to play a positive role in improving urban land governance to address the quest of tenure security through functional legal cadastre designed by the federal and regional government almost does not implement in study areas. According to existing urban land regulation and implementation, practices show that Ethiopia's urban land management is delegated under the federal constitution to regional states, city governments, and municipalities. Nevertheless, there is no common denominator to manage urban land in different regional states in Ethiopia. Besides the practice of urban land management was ineffective and inefficient. The main challenge of urban land management was linked with law formulation and its use. The Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia's constitutional land-related laws suffers from many common defects, ranging from the form in which they are enacted to how they define the fundamental nature of the power relationship between the state and its citizens. Ethiopian Constitution asserts state ownership of land and there are no private property rights inland. Land laws, particularly in the area of urban land management, are procured and passed by the economically viable and social influential to assist their benefitting from state actions than from any alleged need of society. Besides urban land proclamations offer some land rights guarantees and some rights for regional government, but there is no nationwide urban land guiding principle and organization that serves as a coordinating body at the national level of government for policy discussion and coordination of urban land management.

In addition, the urban land sector was controlled by the influential to exploit the state’s power for their purposes; because of urban land management structure is weak. Since there is virtually no strong system of checks and balances between government organs the state in towns, such as the police and judiciary, were no responses to serve the interests of the public, and the powerful bias the decisions of the court. An extreme form of corruption occurs on a grand scale through state capture. Hence those in power illegally transferred urban lands to their relatives and allies and they decide urban land governance and laws in their favor.

On the other hand, the institutionalization of informal fees has become so commonplace in urban land management and without informal fees sometimes it was impossible to get a plot of land in towns. Besides the auction processes for accessing urban land, in particular, are also argued to be highly vulnerable to corruption. The urban land sector had neither adequately trained staff for the land policy being developed nor the resources to carry out these programs. These are linked with a high degree of informality as a result of a lack of clear legislation and misunderstanding about the applicability of the rule and regulation.

Finally, the urban land management sector failed to implement the principles of good governance in day-to-day activities of land and land-related property administration of the town. The driver of good governance problems is poor participation of the local community, lack of transparency, accountability, and access to information.